In this paper, I show that in the Pāli Canon there was a tradition of Buddhist logic, but this tradition was weak, and the proto-logic we can reconstruct on the basis of the early Pāli texts can be evaluated as a predecessor of the Hindu logic. According to the textual analysis of the Pāli texts, we can claim that at the time of the closing of the Pāli Canon (excluding the later addition of the Milindapañha into it by the Burmese tradition) there did not exist the Nyāya philosophy known by the Nyāya Sūtra. Meanwhile, we can assume that the Milindapañha, the best logical source of early Pāli literature, was written under influences of the Gandhāran Buddhists and this text preceded the Nyāya philosophy.
Introduction
This paper provides an argument supporting the claim that the authors of the Pāli Canon and Milindapañha did not know about the Nyāya school of logic and knew nothing about syllogisms defined in the Nyāya Sūtra (Sect. 2). The methodology for this conclusion is discussed in Sect. 3 .
The argument is focused on the following claims: (i) the terms denoting logic (such as nyāya) and occurring in the Pāli Canon were not used, in accordance with their contextual meanings, to denote the school of logic or the Nyāya Sūtra (Sect. 4); (ii) in some early Pāli suttas some terms denoting logical reasoning have sometimes negative connotations (Sect. 4), nevertheless in the Theravāda tradition there are many explanations why we need logic still; (iii) in the Pāli Canon, the terms like nyāya have the meaning of the method of Buddhists distinguishing them from non-Buddhists (Sect. 4); (iv) it seems that in the Pāli texts there are a few logical syllogisms used for the logical purpose, but the majority of syllogisms are used without understanding of their logical nature, they are rather used for the purpose of rhetoric, e.g. syllogisms often play a rhetorical role in the Kathāvatthu (Sect. 5); (v) so, the author of the Kathāvatthu had no good competence in symbolic (systematic) logic, because there are a lot of sophisms and other fallacies among correct syllogisms (Sect. 5); (vi) in the Kathāvatthu and in other Abhidhamma texts there is no requirement to give examples in syllogisms-but it is one of the principal requirements of the Nyāya tradition as well as the Yogācāra logic (Sect. 5); (vii) the author(s) of the Milindapañha (its historical context is considered in Sect. 6) did have a good competence in symbolic logic, e.g. there are no sophisms and we face a requirement here to give examples for verifying statements-this requirement is explained in the text in a more primitive way terminologically than it was done in the Nyāya Sūtra, hence this text preceded the Nyāya philosophy and can have had an impact on the latter (Sect. 7) .
Taking into account the genesis of logical knowledge in early Pāli literature from (i) to (vii) we can assume that the Gandhāran (Greco-Buddhist) influence on the origin of Indian systematic logic is highly possible and at least not excluded if we concentrate just on the Pāli texts. In order to infer this statement, the Mill's joint method of agreement and difference is applied 1 :
On the one hand, the Milindapañha is the only early Pāli source in which we deal with a proto-Nyāya logic-it is a main feature of this text to be logical among all other canonical texts, and, on the other hand, the Milindapañha was written in Gandhāra, the region where the Greek language was official for 300-400 years at least (e.g. it was used for edicts, business documentation, courts, and taxation as lingua franca) and the Hellenistic influences on social life here were evident. Thus, the early Buddhist knowledge of systematic logic is supposed to be not connected to the Nyāya Sūtra, but can have been established under a Hellenistic (Gandhāran) influence.
Formally:
The canonical texts, such as the Yamaka, the Kalahavivāda-sutta (Sutta-nipāta 4.11), the Kathāvatthu, and the Milindapañha, deal with syllogisms;
The Yamaka deals with a converse of implications (reversing its two parts);
The Kalahavivāda-sutta deals with a transitivity of implications (combining several implications having a joint part);
The Kathāvatthu deals with modus ponens and modus tollens;
The Milindapañha deals with modus ponens and modus tollens;
The Yamaka, the Kalahavivāda-sutta, and the Kathāvatthu do not provide syllogisms with a Nyāya or proto-Nyāya way of verifying premises;
The Milindapañha provides syllogisms with a proto-Nyāya way of verifying premises;
The Yamaka, the Kalahavivāda-sutta, and the Kathāvatthu use sophisms and combine correct and incorrect syllogisms;
The Milindapañha does not use sophisms and applies only correct syllogisms;
The Milindapañha is, perhaps, the only early Pāli text written in Gandhāra by, one expects, a direct Hellenistic or Gandhāran (Greco-Buddhist) influence; ----------------------------Therefore, probably, the correct application of inference rules in the early Buddhist logic is explained by a Hellenistic or Gandhāran (Greco-Buddhist) influence. 2 Notice that the Mill's joint method of agreement and difference I have applied in this paper is not deductive, but plausible with a high probability.
Hence, I have performed an experiment as a logician to check the logical culture of ways of using syllogisms in the Pāli Canon and, as a consequence of my experiment, I am probabilistically concluding that the authors of the early Pāli texts did not know the Nyāya Sūtra. It means that on the basis of the corpus of these texts we can claim that at the time of the authors of the early Pāli texts (until the 1st century A.D. or even later) the Nyāya school of logic did not exist yet. (According to some other data the Nyāya Sūtra 2 Formally, a very short version: Y (Yamaka), Kl (Kalahavivāda-sutta), Kt (Kathāvatthu), M (Milindapañha) occur together with x (correct applications of inference rules) and y (incorrect applications of inference rules); M as the only Pāli text from Gandhāra occur together with x (correct applications of inference rules) and z (proto-nyāya doctrine on verification premises) and without y (incorrect applications of inference rules); Y (Yamaka), Kl (Kalahavivāda-sutta), Kt (Kathāvatthu) occur with y (incorrect applications of inference rules) and without z (proto-nyāya doctrine on verification premises); ------------------Therefore M as the only Pāli text from Gandhāra is the cause, or the effect, or a part of the cause of x and z. In other words, to be Gandhāran is the cause, or the effect, or a part of the cause of x and z.
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is dated not earlier than the 2nd century A.D. too, e.g. there are quotings in this sūtra from some early Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts dated to this century or later and written probably in Gandhāra, too-their early fragments in Gāndhārī are excavated in this area).
Problem Setting
The following presuppositions are the most principal for any system of symbolic logic:
(i) Each proposition should be factual and, then, it is either true or false. It is true if it correctly describes an appropriate fact, otherwise it is false. For example, the proposition 'it's raining' is true if it's raining now indeed in a specified place. (ii) Into our reasoning we can involve only true propositions. (iii) There are logical schemata that are called inference rules and they infer only true propositions from true premises. Hence, our conclusions are ever true if we apply inference rules in relation to true premises. In symbolic logic the following two inference rules are fundamental:
(1) Modus ponens. Let A and B be two factual propositions. Assume that 'A implies B' and A are both asserted to be true. Then we can draw the conclusion that B must be true, too. Symbolically: A ⇒ B is true; A is true. Then B is true, also.
(2) Modus tollens. Let A and B be two factual propositions again. Suppose, 'A implies B' is considered true, but it is not the case that B. Then we can draw the conclusion that it is not the case that A, too. Symbolically:
In the Old-Greek philosophy, the above presuppositions (i)-(iii) were widely accepted due to the logical works written by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Chrysippus (ca. 279-ca. 206 B.C.). In the meanwhile, Aristotle proposed a modification of modus ponens and modus tollens for categorical propositions and Chrysippus formulated modus ponens and modus tollens conventionally in the way as said above.
Hence, if we can observe that someone understands presuppositions (i)-(iii) and can follow them in his/her reasoning, then he or she possesses a good logical competence. This competence is detected in the Nyāya as well as in the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts. Certainly, the Nyāya Sūtra was one of the Formally: If the Lord (īśvara) is a cause (A), then human actions are without fruits (B). Nevertheless, they are ever with fruits (¬B). Then the Lord is not a cause (¬A) 3 :
(A ⇒ B); ¬B -----¬A. The Nyāya Sūtra is dated very differently by differet scholars: from the 6th century B.C. to the 2nd century A.D. [23, p. 4] . Let us notice that the dating from the 6th to the 5th century B.C. is quite improbable from the archeological point of view. The matter is that at that time the Painted Grey Ware culture existed which is characterized by a very low-scale urbanization at the Ganga-Yamuna valley. For instance, the settlements of this culture could be quite large, but they had no town planning and consisted of buildings made from bamboo and loam which can be compared to today's slums of Mumbaian unstructured housing and lack of infrastructure. There were no states as well as no cities in the strict sense. Therefore it is obvious why there was neither a writing system nor money. The large-scale urbanization began only since ca. 400 B.C. Theśraman . a movement was a spiritual way to resist this urbanization-since that time it was just the very beginning of philosophical reflection of India in the pure meaning. Hence, we cannot date the Nyāya Sūtra from the 6th to the 5th century B.C. certainly. It was a late-Vedic period without any sūtras. In any case, among different date patterns, the 2nd century A.D. is the most reasonable dating of the Nyāya Sūtra from the standpoint of archeology. At that time in the Kus .ā n . a Empire there was observed a flowering of sciences and arts in India, the first big fruit yielded by the large-scale urbanization started from ca. 400 B.C. Textologically, there are also many arguments supporting this dating. So, these arguments are collected by Vidyabhusana [43] and they are as follows: (i) the Nyāya Sūtra contains many quotes from some early Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts which are dated to the 2nd century A.D. or even later; (ii) the Nyāya Sūtra can be examined as a systematization of logical pieces from the Caraka-sam . hitā dated to the same century.
(i) For instance, there are evidences that the author(s) of the Nyāya Sūtra accepts ks . an . ikavāda (teaching on momentariness), a key doctrine of Yogācāra (as well as of the earlier Sautrāntika thought), e.g.:
There [28] . We know that the prajñāpāramitā teaching was very popular in the North-West of India in the Kus .ā n . a period. In the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa (LIII v. 575) it is affirmed that under Kanis . ka the prajñāpāramitā was 'established' (pratis . t . hitā) in the North-West. This doctrine with theśūnyatā concept served as a background for the fragments BC4 and BC11. In BC4 we read 'benefit of freedom from all passions' (vairāga-ȃnuśam . sa) and in BC11 'benefit of release' (avasarga-ȃnuśam . sa) in practising the bodhisattva path started with understanding (parijñā) the origins of suffering and finished at abandoning (prahān . a) these origins and realising the emptiness of all dharmas within a direct realization of the unconditioned (lokottara-bhūta-jñāna) [28] .
There are some textological evidences that Nāgārjuna was a resident of the Kus .ā n . a Empire. It is stated in the Rājataram . gin .ī dating from the 12th century that Nāgārjuna was a lord of the earth (bhūmīśvaro) in Kāśmīr under the rule of the following three Kus .ā n . Hiouen Thsang, who visited India in 645 A.D., mentions Aśvaghos . a, Deva, Nāgārjuna, and Kumāralabdha, as the contemporaries of Kanis . ka and 'as the four suns which illumine the world'. Aśvaghos . a is named also the spiritual advisor of Kanis . ka [3, pp. 302-303] .
Hence, in order to prove that the Nyāya Sūtra was created in Gandhāra in the 2nd century A.D. (or later) indeed, we should trace the proto-Nyāya teaching (first of all, the pramān . a doctrine) in the Buddhist sources before the 
Discussion on Methodology
According to some recent results in experimental psychology and cognitive science, systematic (or symbolic) logic is not an 'innate' knowledge of human beings. In order to know logic, we should especially study it and, first of all, study the ways how it can be applied in different situations: public discourse, science or private strategy. As a consequence, we can use strategic, creative or even critical thinking without any logical competence if we did not study systematic logic before, and even if we have studied it, we usually do not follow it in life. At first, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman showed that even experts take current decisions without using systematic logic. Therefore, they established a research programme in cognitive science to study cognitive heuristics and biases, i.e. ways of making decisions in life: decisions in risk situations, prompt decisions, creative decisions and so on [41] .
In the paper, I try to find out the origin of the emergence of logic in India according to the Pāli texts.
Logic is based on distinguishing particulars and generals. Let us consider an example from the Pāli Canon-how particulars and generals are examined in the Yamaka. In Sanskrit yamaka means 'twin' or 'pair' and it is used to denote a rhetoric trope with a repetition of words after their permutation. In All faultless states (are present). Are they all faultless roots? These faultless roots (are present). Are they all faultless states? [19, p. 22] .
Thus, among all the converses from (i) to (iv) for all pairs considered in the Yamaka we see just a correct declaration of what a general is and what a particular is and, at the same time, we cannot find out logical inference rule, even in respect to converse or inverse. For example, we know that from 'All A are B' it follows logically that 'Some B are A' (conversation). Nevertheless, the author(s) of the Yamaka does not know this rule, see also [11, pp. 306-310] ; [44, pp. 152 ] as well as others. This fact is apologetically explained as follows:
The Yamaka does not consist of a set of logical exercises and is not a textbook on applied logic at all. The members of the pairs of statements do not stand to each other in the logical relation of one being an immediate inference of the other. To conceive them as such is wholly to misunderstand the purpose of the book, which is not an exercise in logical gymnastics, but is intended to convey to the reader the exact logical boundaries of important concepts in the light of their actual technical usage [11, p. 309 ].
So, on the one hand, the Yamaka demonstrates a well-developed philosophical discourse with distinguishing particulars and generals. But, on the other hand, its author does not express any knowledge of logical rules for inferring. This situation with the Yamaka is an example of adopting the first method applied in this paper, called a structural analysis of logical competence. We can always detect this competence or its deficit by textual analysis: whether there are some evidences of inference rules which are correct from the standpoint of symbolic logic. Even if the author demonstrates a philosophical discourse with some logical notions, but (s)he also often uses sophisms or does not apply inference rules at all, this means that (s)he does not have true logical competence.
Logic is a part of algebra and logical competence means that the author can combine some lexemes algebraically, e.g. (s)he can draw true conclusions from true premises mechanically by means of some algebraic tools.
In fragments of trial records and omens written in Akkadian we can detect some algebraic tools used for trial decisions and forecasting. Hence, the authors of these fragments possessed good logical competence. In India, for example, this good competence is detected in the texts written by representatives of the Hindu schools of Nyāya and Vaiśes . ika and by representatives of the Buddhist schools of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.
The Kalahavivāda-sutta (Sutta-nipāta 4.11) is another example from the Pāli Canon in which the author involves difficult logical notions without any logical inference rules. In this discourse, for rhetorical purpose the author uses Vol. 13 (2019) On the Origin of Indian Logic from 357 a transitivity of implications, when several implications with a joint part can be combined among themselves to build sorities [44, pp. 130-136] . Nevertheless, the author implements semantically true transitions some of which are not correct formally. The Pāli Canon is a unique Indian text corpus, because we have a chance to observe how the logical competence of its authors continuously grew up from zero in analyzing the same subject of abhidhamma. The first definitions of dhammas and the first logical divisions of their concepts contained many fallacies because of 'mutually intercrossing, over-lapping or partially coinciding notions,' see an appropriate apologetics for this fact in [11, p. 294 ]. But later they became correct and there were two ways of division: (i) by choosing contradictory terms (e.g. in classifying some dukas (pairs) (see [44, p. 49] ); (ii) and by choosing contrary terms with a neutral between them (e.g. in classifying some tikas (triplets): sukha (happiness), dukkha (unhappiness), and adukkhamasukha (neither unhappiness nor happiness) (see [44, p. 52] ).
In reconstructing the history of logical competence of the authors of the Pāli Canon I appeal to the second method, historical reconstructive hermeneutics. This hermeneutics allows us to examine texts diachronically and it is grounded on the motto of Ludwig Wittgenstein: 'use as meaning' according to which we should reconstruct meanings of words on the basis of understanding their contextual use.
This hermeneutics is the opposite of the philosophical synchronic hermeneutics. The latter examines texts synchronically for the sake of philosophical inspirations. It can be productive from the point of view of philosophy, although it is not scientific. For instance, sometimes the Abhidhamma is analyzed by Ronkin [26] by the philosophical synchronic hermeneutics, e.g. when she compares abhidhamma and the vaiśes . ika way of classifying categories. On the one hand, this comparison is interesting philosophically, but, on the other hand, it ignores the fact that the Vaiśes . ika classification of categories demonstrates a good logical competence, while the Pāli classifications were proposed at a different time and some of them are not perfect logically. So, from the standpoint of historical reconstructive hermeneutics the latter fact would mean that some Pāli classifications of dhammas were created earlier than the Vaiśes . ika classification. Historically, the Vaiśes . ika one can be compared to the Abhidharmakośakārikā of Vasubandhu, because their logical competences are comparable and perfect simultaneously.
Some versions of philosophical synchronic hermeneutics can be even absurd historically. For instance, according to the Mīmām . sā hermeneutics the Nyāya school of logic existed at the time of Kr . s . n . a and Arjuna, as the word of nyāya is mentioned in the Mahābhārata:
The sciences called nyāya, orthoephy and treatment of diseases; <. . . > a description of places of pilgrimage and other holy places of rivers, mountains, forests, the ocean, of heavenly cities and the kalpas; the art of war <. . . > (Mahābhārata 1.1.52). The historical reconstructive hermeneutics allows us to trace back the logical competence of the authors of the Pāli Canon. In [11, 44] there is proposed a well-grounded reconstruction of logical discourse in the early Pāli texts, although the first book is quite subjective, because its author tries to be so apologetic for Theravāda. In both books their authors note that from the very beginning, the abhidhamma as well as other texts was often taught in the form of questions and answers and, as a result, some (proto-)logical techniques were thought up for the purpose of rhetoric. For example, in the Nikāyas andĀgamas the following four kinds of explanations of questions were proposed [11, p. 281 ]; [44, pp. 72-73]: (i) ekam . savyākaran .ī yo, a categorical explanation when a questioner demands 'Yes' or 'No' from an answerer; (ii) pat . ipucchā-vyākaran .ī yo, an answer by a counterquestion when an answerer returns a reply in the form of a new question; (iii) t . hapanīyo, when a questioner suggests some reply to an answerer but all such suggestions are set aside as inapplicable; (4) vibhajja-vyākaran .ī yo, an analytical explanation when a questioner requests some explanation of an answerer.
One of the first logical tools represented in the Pāli texts is to classify things according to the following four-fold assertions: (i) S is P ; (ii) S is not P ; (iii) S is and is not P ; (iv) S neither is nor is not P . For instance, the Buddha engages these four-fold assertions to show that none of them 'fit the case' (upeti). Thus he says that when an enlightened person dies: (i) 'he is reborn ... does not fit the case' (upapajjatī ti ... na upeti); (ii) 'he is not reborn ... does not fit the case' (na upapajjatī ti ... na upeti); (iii) 'he is and is not reborn ... does not fit the case' (upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī ti ... na upeti), (iv) 'he is neither reborn nor not reborn ... does not fit the case' (n'eva upapajjati na na upapajjatī ti . . . upeti) (Majjhima Nikāya 1.486; [11, p. 289] ). This type of answer corresponds to the following strategy in questioning: (i) 'Is S P ?'; (ii) 'If not, is S not P ?' (iii) 'If not, is S both P and not P ?' (iv) 'If not, is S neither P nor not P ?'
As we see, the first logical techniques, such as the four-fold assertions, which were invented in the Pāli Canon, were used, first of all, for some rhetorical purposes.
Thus, in this paper I propose the structuralist analysis of logical competence, how it is expressed in the Pāli Canon, by means of the historical reconstructive hermeneutics. My aim is to show that the Milindapañha is a unique Pāli text close to the true original point of logic's emergence in India.
Some Occurrences of the Terms 'Logic', 'Logical' in the Pāli Canon
The Milindapañha consists of many short dialogues and each dialogue can be examined as (or reduced to) a syllogism with the following four steps: This structure of syllogism proposed in the Milindapañha holds even for definitions:
(c) "Give me an illustration." "Opammam . karohī" ti.
Then the Nāgasena illustration follows.
(d) Accepting the definition put forward by Nāgasena. "Kallo'si bhante nāgasenā" ti.
Let us notice that this kind of definition is very close to the Aristotelian model of genus-differentia definitions: the item is defined through its differentia, but the difference from Aristotle is that Nāgasena always verifies his definitions by examples.
In the Milindapañha there is no name for the four-step syllogisms. The wordñāya, the Pāli analogue for the Sanskrit nyāya, occurs in the meaning 'the method, the dhamma'ñāya dhamma (Milindapañha 6.1.3), i.e. as a method, distinguishing Buddhists from non-Buddhists. Let us emphasize that nāya occurs very often in the Pāli Canon, but never in the meaning of the Hindu school of logic. In most cases it means an analytic method or even a Buddhist method of cognition distinguishing Buddhists from non-Buddhists. For example, there is an expression 'the noble method' (ariya cassañāya) in the Gahapativagga of the Sam . yutta Nikāya:
At Savatthī. Then the householder Anathapin . d . ika approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him: "Householder, when five fearful animosities have subsided in a noble disciple, and he possesses the four factors of stream-entry, and he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom the noble method, if he wishes he could by himself declare of himself: 'I am one finished with hell, finished with the animal realm, finished with the domain of ghosts, finished with the plane of misery, the bad destinations, the nether world. I am a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as my destination" [5, Contextually, only the Milindapañha among other Pāli texts assumes thatñāya should include 'logic'-by assuming the four-step syllogism as a tool of true cognitions. As we see, the Milindapañha is unique not only because of its historical context (the only Pāli book directly connected to Gandhāra), but also due to its respect for syllogisms as a part of the method of Buddhists. The point is that the doctrinal difference between the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna teaching is significant, indeed, but the most intriguing difference holds in respect to logic. While in the Mahāyāna there are many logical treatises and logic is regarded as one of the most important Buddhist sciences and arts, in the Theravāda there is no interest in logic as such, there are no logical treatises in the strict sense. That fact is in line with the Buddha's words concerning logical matters in the earliest sūtras (Pāli: suttas). Let us refer to the Kālāma Sutta contained in the Aṅguttara Nikāya of the Tipit . aka, the Pāli Canon. In this sutta, the Buddha sounds a note of caution on the subject of what should be avoided in Buddhism:
Come, Kālāmas. Do not go upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumour; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another's seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, 'The monk is our teacher.' Kālāmas, when you yourselves know: 'These things are good; these things are not blameable; these things are praised by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and happiness,' enter on and abide in them [40, p. 5] . In this short quoted text, the Buddha talks about things which are similar to idols of the mind (idola mentis) proposed by Francis Bacon (1561-1626). For example, the Buddha warns us against traditional visions and dogmas including 'repeated hearing' (anussava), 'tradition' (paramparā), 'rumor' (itikirā), 'following a scripture' (pit . aka-sampadāna), 'following an authority' (bhabbarūpatāya and saman . o no garū). Meanwhile, he warns us against any logical reasoning, too. Namely, first, he talks against 'surmise' (takkahetu), which is better to be translated as 'because of (deductive) reasoning'. It means that any truth of dhamma (the Buddha's teaching) cannot be proven by inferring from premises. Second, the Buddha warns us against 'an axiom' (nayahetu), making an assumption to be verified later. Third, he avoids 'specious reasoning' (ākāraparivitakka), accepting something after considering its reasons. Fourth, he criticizes 'a bias towards a notion that has been pondered over' (dit . t . hinijjhānakkhantiyā), starting from some view or opinion (dit . t . hi). Hence, according to the Kālāma Sutta, logical matters (e.g. the art of debates) are excessive for Buddhism and logical reasoning is not enough for our liberation. Another commentary to this sutta is by Watanabe [44, p. 105 ]. We should just analyze our own action (kamma) and its consequences or effects (phala). The same attitude towards logical subjects is seen in the Theravāda (i.e. relatively early) Buddhism, as well.
In many other early suttas, such as some in the Sutta-nipāta, the Buddha expresses the same sceptical view of logical reasoning, e.g.:
Buddha:
Indeed, there are not many and varied truths differing from perception of the ever-true in the world; but they work upon their views with logic: "Truth! Falsehood!" So they speak in dualities. Based on what is seen, heard, On precepts and vows, or what is cognized, They look down on others. Convinced of their own theories, pleased with themselves, They say, "My opponent is a fool, no expert." [16, p. 279 ]. Thus, the wordñāya, the Pāli analogue for the Sanskrit nyāya, never occurs in the Pāli Canon in the meaning of the school of logic or the Nyāya Sūtra. The only case that seems to be a mention of the school of logic is as follows. In the Milindapañha, Menander or Milinda was regarded as an excellent expert in all the 19 Hindu sciences and arts:
Of these two the novice became the King called Milinda in the city of Sagala in India. He was wise, experienced, clever, able; he was one who acted conscientiously at the time of doing all the (magic) devices, ceremonies and observances concerning things past, future and present. Many were the arts he had mastered, that is to say: the revealed tradition, secular lore, the Sankhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeśika systems, accountancy, music, medicine, the four Vedas, the Purān . as, the oral traditions, astronomy, conjuring, logic, spells, fighting, poetry, reckoning on the fingers, in a word, the nineteen (arts) [ Canon was finally edited. The translation of nīti as nyāya is a kind of historical falsification. First of all, nyāya is a teaching concerning pramān . a how to verify or falsify logical reasoning. And, as we try to prove, this teaching did not exist before the 1st century A.D.
Let us examine the 19 Hindu sciences and arts for which Menander was said to be a great scholar: (1) suti veda-the Hindu holy texts presented by the Vedas; (2) sammuti-moral codes and sage advices such as the Manusmr . ti or Manu's Code of Law finally edited after 400 A.D.; (3) saṅkhyā-the Sām . khya philosophy founded by Kapila, its earliest surviving text is the Sāṁkhyakārikā written by Iśvarakr . s . n . a from the 3rd to the 4th century A.D.; (4) yogāthe yoga philosophy founded by Patañjali, its basic text is the Yoga Sūtra dated from the 2nd to the 4th century A.D.; (5) nīti-the nīti philosophy or political philosophy including several arts: diplomacy and statecraft (Pāli: rajanīti); economics (Pāli: atthanīti); morality (Pāli: lokanīti); ethics (Pāli: dhammanīti); the Buddhist ethics that included didactic stories and maxims on numerous everyday subjects (Pāli: vaddhananīti); (6) visesikā-the Vaiśes . ika philosophy founded by Kan .ā da, its basic text is the Vaiśes . ika Sūtra cited, e.g., the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra, one of the seven books of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma written from the 1st to the 2nd century A.D.; thus, the abhidharma (Pāli: abhidhamma) is a Buddhist alternative to vaiśes . ika; (7) gan . ikāarithmetics; (8) gandhabbā-the Hindu literature on music; (9) tikicchā-the Hindu medicine; (10) catubbedā-the art of archery; (11) purān .ā -the corpus of histories and ancient tales; (12) itihāsā-the Hindu chronics saying 'it happened thus', such as the Mahābhārata; (13) jotisā-the Hindu astrology that was influenced by the Greek astrology in the higher measure, because the Yavanajātaka (or the Greek Jātaka), a book on astrology translated from Greek in the 2nd century A.D., was one of the earliest sources of the Hindu astrology [22] ; (14) māyā-the knowledge of stratagem; (15) ketu that is traditionally read by the Theravāda as hetu-the art of weighing and analyzing the pro et con of the matter in question, in the way it was demonstrated in the Kathāvatthu; however, if it is ketu indeed, then it means Hindu omens; (16) However, the meaning 'the method of Buddhists' was preserved also: Thus, the term nyāya in the meaning of the Hindu school of logic or the Nyāya Sūtra does not occur in the Pāli Canon, actually. Instead of that the Pāli term nāya had the meaning of one or other aspect of the wisest Buddhist method and, according to the Milindapañha, the four-step syllogisms are an important part of cognitions within this method.
Logical Reconstructions of Some Conclusions in the Kathāvatthu
The Milindapañha is organized as a compendium of four-step syllogisms explaining abhidhamma. There is else only one similar treatise, pakaran . a, written especially for the purpose of debates with non-Theravādins (more precisely historically, with non-Vibhajjavādins) for teaching the abhidhamma. This compendium of logical reasoning for different debates is called the Kathāvatthu, it is contained in the Abhidhamma Pit . aka of the Pāli Canon. In this Section I will try to show that its author(s) had no competence in logic because of many fallacies, although a lot of syllogisms of the Kathāvatthu are correct and really difficult. This is the main difference of that book from the Milindapañha, where In this treatise we find many correct complex syllogisms, such as modus tollens:
Hence your first answer is refuted. (ropanā).
. Another example of correct syllogism as a modification of modus tollens is logically formulated in the Kathāvatthu as follows: 'If D be denied of C, then B should have been denied of A. But you affirmed B of A. Therefore, that B can be affirmed of A, but not D of C, is wrong,' or in the simpler way:
. One of the most interesting items of evidence for the genuine role that logic plays in Theravāda Buddhism is contained in the first chapter of this text, called the Puggalakathā; the latter describes a debate between a Theravādin (more precisely historically, Vibhajjavādins), who is considered an orthodox Buddhist in the text, and a Puggalavādin, another Buddhist who believes in the existence of a soul-like personal entity (puggalo). The point is that the reasoning involved in the debate from the opposite sides shows that the Theravādin as well as the Puggalavādin do not understand the subject of logic as ultimate inferring, although they use correct syllogisms sometimes.
Let us introduce some symbolic notations to make their debate more transparent:
A is B := "'The person" (puggalo) is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.' 4 Let us notice that in symbolic logic the proposition "A is B" always has the formal meaning of implication: "if A, then B" (A ⇒ B) or "if something is A, then it is B, too" (A ⇒ B) . This formal treatment of affirmative propositions in the way of implications was well known by Indian logicians such as Dharmakīrti (he was a representative of Yogācāra school). He exemplifies this relationship as follows: "Dalbergia is a tree". As a consequence, it means that if something is a Dalbergia, then we can conclude that it is a tree, too, but not vice versa.
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Puggalo upalabbhati saccikat . t . haparamatthenāti (Kathāvatthu 1).
A is C := 'Is "the person" known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known?' 
. It is an ad absurdum, because A ⇒ B is held by the Puggalavādin to be true. The Theravādin holds that this should mean that that A ⇒ C is true, too. Hence, we see that the final refutation is logically correct, according to the Theravādin understanding of the terms A and B, here: 'If A is B, then A is C.' So, if 'A is B' is true, 'A is C' should be true, too. The Puggalavādin maintains that 'A is C' is false. However, it means, as the Theravādin truly claims, according to their analysis that 'A is B' should be false, also. This syllogism is a classical modus tollens. Hence, the Theravādin has just refuted the Puggalavādin's opinion. But, let us look at the continuation of this dialogue:
Puggalavādin. 
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¬¬(A ⇒ B).
It is an ad absurdum, as well, because A ⇒ C is true for the Puggalavādin. From this it follows that A ⇒ B is true, also. So, the Puggalavādin puts forward another implication, namely:
The Theravādin states that 'A is not C' is false. From this it should follow according to the same modus tollens, as the Puggalavādin notes now, that 'A is not B' is false. It means that the Puggalavādin has just refuted the Theravādin's opinion.
Thus, we have the following opposite sides:
Theravādin:
In order to apply the same modus tollens, the Theravādin appeals to the implication 'if A is B, then A is C' as the first premise of his syllogism and the Puggalavādin to the same implication, but with negations 'if A is not B, then A is not C' as the first premise of his syllogism. Who is right? Nobody! The problem is that the Theravādin as well as the Puggalavādin cannot agree on the first premise of their reasoning. Their dialogue looks like a logical paradox: the same propositions are true and false at the same time. One opposite side puts forward one implication to prove a contradictory statement. Another side puts forward the same implication, but with negations to prove another statement. Such a dialogue can become interminable. Indeed, we face many modifications of the first dialogue in the Puggalakathā. Formally:
Theravādin: if'A is B' is true by the Puggalavādin, then 'A is C' should be true by the Puggalavādin also, but it is not.
Puggalavādin:
if 'A is not B' is true by the Theravādin, then 'A is not C' should be true by the Theravādin also, but it is not. the other hand, they do not give true inferences, but sophisms in fact, because the Theravādin uses the implication 'if A is B is true, then A is C is true' where the antecedent occurs he considers false and the Puggalavādin uses the implication 'if A is not B is true, then A is not C is true' where there is the antecedent he examines as false, too. However, we cannot infer from the false premises! This significant fact that modus tollens is a sophism because of the unverified implications is ignored by Jayatilleke [11] and Watanabe [44] . A complicated reasoning with many formulas does not mean immediately that its author is a logician. The matter is that this reasoning should be correct formally with, necessarily, correct verifications of all premises. Let us introduce the following new notations: A is B := "'The person" (puggalo) is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.' C is B := 'Material quality 5 is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.' Then we have the following next dialogue:
Theravādin. 5 Then they have used the same reasoning where for 'material quality' they have substituted the following new items: feeling; perception; coefficients (saṅkhāras); consciousness; the organ of sight; the organ of hearing; the organ of smell; the organ of taste; the organ of touch; visible object; sound; odour; taste; tangible object; mind (sensis communis); cognizable object; eye as subjective element; sights as subjective element; visual cognition as subjective element; ear as subjective element; sounds as subjective element; auditory cognition as subjective element; nose as subjective element; odours as subjective element; olfactory cognition as subjective element; tongue as subjective element; tastes as subjective element; gustatory cognition as subjective element; body as subjective element; touches as subjective element; tactile cognition as subjective element; mind as subjective element; mind-cognizing as subjective element; cognizables as objective element; eye as controlling power; ear as controlling power; nose as controlling power; tongue as controlling power; body as controlling power; mind as controlling power; female sex as controlling power; male sex as controlling power; life as controlling power; pleasure as controlling power; pain as controlling power; joy as controlling power; grief as controlling power; hedonic indifference as controlling power; faith as controlling power; energy as controlling power; mindfulness as controlling power; samādhi as controlling power; understanding as controlling power; the thought: "I shall come to know the unknown" as controlling power; the coming to know as controlling power; the having known as controlling power. 
Symbolically:
. Nevertheless, it is an incorrect form. The logically corrected form is thus:
. It is an incorrect form, also. The logically corrected form is as follows:
. We deal here with two modifications of modus tollens again and in the same manner the Theravādin and the Puggalavādin demonstrate that they do not know how implication can be verified. So, they apply different implications to infer contradictions, since they do not have a procedure for verifying conditional propositions as well as other propositions at all. The Theravādin is based on the scheme: 'If A is B and C is B, then A and C are distinct things.' If it is false that 'A and C are distinct things,' then it is false that 'A is B and C is B.' The Puggalavādin offers the following scheme: 'If A is not B and C is B, then A and C are distinct things.' If it is false that 'A and C are distinct things,' then it is false that 'A is not B and C is B.'
The main problem of the author(s) of the Kathāvatthu is that its author(s) does not know what the subject of logic is, but its subject is to infer automatically from premises which are verified as true sentences. In the Hindu terms, they do not know what pramān . a (Sanskrit: 'means of knowledge') ishow we can verify sentences. Notice that an appropriate Pāli word pamān . a occurs several times in the Pāli Canon, but never in the meaning of 'means of knowledge'. The teaching on pramān . a appeared in India much later than all the texts of the Pāli Canon were composed. In this teaching all the sources of the true knowledge are classified: pratyaks . a (Pāli: paccakkha; 'evidence,' 'first premises,' 'axioms' or 'underlying things', Øpoke…menon in the Aristotelian meaning), anumāna (Pāli: anumāna; 'inference'), upamāna (Pāli: upamāna; 'comparison,' 'analogy'), arthāpatti (Sanskrit: 'postulation, derivation from circumstances' there is not this word in the Pāli Canon), anupalabdhi (Sanskrit: 'non-perception, negative proof;' there is not a common word in the Pāli Canon, but in the Milindapañha (I.138) it is claimed that a real self is anupalabbhamāne -it is not being apprehended) andśabda (Pāli: sadda; 'word, testimony of past or present reliable experts'). In the European logic pramān . a is a logical semantics and a logical epistemology, i.e. the rules of how to ascribe meanings to logical propositions. The Theravādin as well as the Puggalavādin are not familiar with any logical semantics. Therefore, they cannot agree on using premises. They do not know how to verify or falsify atomic propositions and how to build up true composite propositions on the basis of atomic ones. Although they know some correct syllogisms, they have no idea how these syllogisms can be verified or falsified.
Hence, the Kathāvatthu cannot be evaluated as a logical treatise in fact. There is not even a hint of pramān . a in this text. Meanwhile, there are many sophisms presented as true inference rules, such as:
Theravādin.-Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?
Puggalavādin.-Yes.
Ther.-Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling?
Pugg.-Nay, that cannot truly be said [1, pp. 33-34] . This text contains also a lot of references to authority (śabda of the nyāya) as an ultimate argument: 'it was not said by the Exalted One [A.Sch.-i.e. by the Buddha]' and 'it was said by the Exalted One.'
In the Kathāvatthu there is a dispute with, probably, a follower of an idea according to that all real things are momentary. In other words, the Sautrāntikas ('those who rely upon the sutras [A.Sch.-and avoid the Abhidhamma]') think that items can exist for only one instantaneous moment:
Controverted Point: That all things are momentary conscious units.
Theravādin: Do you imply that a mountain, the ocean, Sumeru chief of mountains, the cohesive, fiery, and mobile elements, grass, twigs, trees, all last only so long in consciousness? You deny. . . [1, p. 363 This dispute is attributed to the 'Sautrāntikas' by the Pāli commentary, but it is unusual and unexpected, since the Sautrāntikas existed from the 2nd to the 3rd century A.D. in the Hellenized region of Gandhāra and they represented a North-Western branch of the Sarvāstivāda School whose ideas are contextually mentioned in the Kathāvatthu, also. The Sautrāntikas proposed the doctrine of momentariness (ks . an . ikavāda) mentioned in the verse above. After the 4th century A.D. the Sautrāntikas were transformed into the Yogācāra School-the most influential school of Gandhāran Buddhism. The idea of extreme momentariness was then adopted by the greatest Buddhist logicians and epistemologists, such as Dignāga (ca. 480-540) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660).
The disputation with, possibly, an intended Vaibhāśika-Sarvāstivādin is as follows:
Controverted Point: That a past or future experience is actually possessed.
Theravādin: But is not the past extinct, departed, changed, come to an end, finished? And is not the future unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced, not brought to pass, not manifested? How then can you call either something that is actually possessed? [1, p. 242] . The Vaibhāśikas represented a North-Eastern branch of the Sarvāstivāda School that took root in Kashmir from the 2nd to the 3rd century A.D.
Hence, the Kathāvatthu as one of the most important texts of the Abhidhamma of the Pāli Canon contained some disputes with the intended Sautrāntikas who had avoided the Abhidhamma as such and the Vaibhāśikas who had proposed another approach to the Abhidhamma which differs a lot from the Theravāda approach. Later, the Vaibhāśika ideas on the Abhidhamma were partly used in the Abhidharmakośa-bhās . ya-the greatest work written by Vasubandhu (ca. the 4th to the 5th century A.D.), who went on to be one of the most famous representatives of the Yogācāra School. Let us notice that Dignāga and Vasubandhu's texts are contained recently in the Tengyur, serving as the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
To sum up, the logical fragments of the Kathāvatthu are not connected to the pramān . a doctrine as a whole and then, most probably, they were transposed from disputes with some representatives of Northern Buddhism (e.g. the Gandhāran Buddhism), because the logic is applied in the Kathāvatthu mechanically, without understanding logical semantics or logical foundations. This feature distinguishes the Kathāvatthu from the Milindapañha, which proposes the four-step syllogisms, where the third step is used especially for verifying premises and inferences.
Historical Context of Milindapañha
The Milindapañha text is organized as a recorded conversation between the Buddhist monk Nāgasena and the Greek king Menander I Soter (Pāli: Milinda; Greek: Mšnandroj A Ð Σwt»r; 165/155-130 B.C.), the ruler of Arachosia, Gandhāra, Punjab, and Mathura (today's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and some nothern states of India) [38] . It is worth noting that Greek clans/dynasties had ruled Bactria since the beginning of Alexander the Great's The people of the Greek dynasties (Pāli: Yona; Sanskrit: Yavana) were replaced by Indo-Scythians orŚakas (Sanskrit:Śaka) who at first continued the Greek Hellenization in India-at the beginning they continued to use the Greek language as official and to worship some Greek deities (Heracles, Zeus, Athena, Apollo and so on) [6, 9] . At first,Śakas occupied Sogdiana and Greek Bactria, then Arachosia, Gandhāra, Sindh, Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. There were different Indo-Scythian clans-which were more or less Hellenized. The following two dynasties were the most powerful and, at the same time, the most Hellenized of the Indo-Scythian clans: Hence, from the archeological point of view we can conclude that the Greek king Menander might have been a Buddhist follower in fact. The talking of Nāgasena to him was possible, indeed. The only problem is that this conversation should have been in Gāndhārī, not Pāli. Nevertheless, there were excavated some texts in Gāndhārī, such as Dhammapada, which are known to be written in Pāli, too. Therefore, the Milindapañha theoretically can be first This text contains some abstract notions such as 'ideas' ("dšaij), 'reason' (aitía), 'each individually' (kaä šk£sthn), 'equalities' (ísóthtoj), 'the first reason of reasons' (prωton tωn a"t…wn), etc. Also, there is the following quite Buddhist description: gšnesin e"nai kaì t¾n fqor¦n ¢dion t¾n tωn a"sqh tωn ¢nagkaĩon, 'generating and destructing all the intelligent entities are forever,' which hints at the wheel of reincarnation. The phrase 'nothing of nothing' (oÚäšn oÚäenój) hints at the concept ofśūnyatā. So, the Early Buddhism influences on this text are not excluded. Then this text is the earliest eclectic document of Greco-Buddhism.
Till now we have no archeological evidences of a direct Greek influence on Nyāya, but there are some direct evidences of their impact on astrology and geometry in India. So, in Buddhist inscriptions, written in the Kharos . t . hī script and in the Gāndhārī language, excavated in Gandhāra, and dated to from the 1st century A.D. to the 3rd century A.D., the following eight Greco-Macedonian months have been recently identified after decoding: 'Artemísioj, Δaísioj, Π£nhmoj, Λèioj, Γorpiaĩoj, 'Apellaĩoj, AÙdunaój, and Ξ andikój [27] . It means that at that time the Greco-Macedonian calendar and astrology was accepted by the Gandhāran Buddhists.
In Medieval Hindu astrology there were some loanwords from Greek: (i) an angular sign: kšntron (Sanskrit: kendra; Syriac: qant . rōn); (ii) Sun: ¼lioj (Sanskrit: heli); (iii) diameter: di£metron (Sanskrit: jāmitra; Syriac: jaθra), (iv) the planet Jupiter: ZeÚj (Sanskrit: jyau); (v) the planet Mars: ' Arhj (Sanskrit:āra), etc. More technical terms: (i) a succedent house: epanaphora (in Greek), panaphara (in Sanskrit); (ii) a cadent house: apoklima (in Greek), apoklima (in Sanskrit); (iii) a void of course Moon: kenodromia (in Greek), kemadruma (in Sanskrit); (iv) an application: sunaphe (in Greek), sunapha (in Sanskrit); (vi) the 10 • segments of the ecliptic: dekanos (in Greek), drekanas (in Sanskrit), etc.
In the Yavanajātaka (one of the first books on Hindu astrology that was written by a Greek author, 'Yavana') reconstructed by David Pingree [21, 22] , we can observe some Greek patterns of thinking, e.g. a mathematical Vol. 13 (2019) On the Origin of Indian Logic from 379 calculation is called 'inference' (anumāna), although in the Hindu tradition mathematics was never based on logic:
One should find that the number of (lapsed) tithis diminished by the number of lapsed avamas equals the number of (civil) days which have passed in the yuga. There is a seven-fold measure of the planetary week-days; in seeking the answer to this, one desires (the use of) inference (anumāna) ( [22] , vol. 1).
The Yavanajātaka was a translation from a book written first in Greek and devoted to astrology, and it is considered that this translation was made in the Western Ks . atrapa Empire in the 2nd century A.D. by Yavaneśvara and versified by Sphujidhvaja in the 3rd century A.D. [21] . The Greek culture had an effect, first of all, on the social organization of communities in Bactria and Gandhāra. Therefore, in the Gāndhārī language there were some administrative terms loaned from Greek, e.g.: (i) stratega 'general, commander' (strathgój); (ii) meridarkha 'meridarch' (eridarch), etc.
As I said above, the Western Ks . atrapas and the Kus .ā n . as continued the Greek Hellenization of India [12, 33] . Nevertheless, they stopped using the Greek language officialy in the 1st-2nd century A.D., but continued to use the Greek alphabet: the Western Ks . atrapas for a Prakrit and the Kus .ā n . as for Bactrian. There was found the Rabatak inscription of 127 A.D. that contains a very important statement concerning the change of the official language in the Empire from the Greek language to the Bactrian one. So, Kanis . ka the Great (Greco-Bactrian: Kanhþke) (his accession to the throne is estimated between ca. 90 and 140 A.D.) was the first who replaced the use of Greek by the "Aryan" language after the 400-years history of the Greek and Greco-Scythian communities in the North-West of India. In fact, this "Aryan" language was Bactrian-one of the Old-Iranian dialects with many loanwords from Greek. The fragment of this Edict: 1-3 The year one of Kanis . ka, the great deliverer, the righteous, the just, the autocrat, the god, worthy of worship, who has obtained the kingship from Nana and from all the gods, who has laid down (i.e. established) the year one as the gods pleased. 3-4 And it was he who laid out (i.e. discontinued the use of) the Ionian speech and then placed the Arya (or Aryan) speech (i.e. replaced the use of Greek by the Aryan or Bactrian language).
4-6
In the year one, it has been proclaimed unto India, unto the whole realm of the governing class including Koonadeano (Kaundinya) and the city of Ozeno (Ozene) and the city of Zageda (Saketa) and the city of Kozambo (Kausambi) and the city of Palabotro (Pataliputra) and so long unto (i.e. as far as) the city of Ziri-tambo (Śri-Campa) [18] .
Since that Kanis . ka edict, the Bactrian language in the Greek script has been used as official for many centuries, even at the Hephthalite time there were some inscriptions in Bactrian. So, many legal documents in Bactrian are found, including (i) the judgments concerned with the sale of agricultural lands, deeds of manumission, and undertakings to solve conflicts; (ii) the land sale contracts written in two copies, an upper and a lower copy, usually on the same sheet; (iii) the tax receipts presented by storekeepers and millers to the people who had brought in goods. These documents were composed on skin in the way the Greeks had done before [35] . Also, there are some Buddhist texts in Bactrian in the Greek script, made on skin which is untypical for the Indian civilization as such [36] .
The main feature of Indian culture is that there is a huge gap and contrast between the traditional Sanskrit texts and the Indian archeology. On the one hand, many descriptions, such as the Mahābhārata, are not confirmed by archeology at all. On the other hand, archeological data reconstructed after excavations have no parallel in Sanskrit texts. For instance, it is unclear why the Buddha was often accompanied by Cupids, see Figs. 4 and 5. What was the tantra for these images?
Hovewer, in the case of the Pāli tradition the phenomenon of Greco-Buddhism in Gandhāra is confirmed textually. This fact supports the authenticity of the Milindapañha-in the meaning that this text was created in Gandhāra indeed. In Sanskrit there are no phrases on Yavanas in respect to their Buddhist faith. In contrast, the Mahāvam . sa or the Great Chronicle of Sri Lanka, composed in Pāli in the late 5th or early 6th century A.D., mentions 'Yonas' (the Greeks) as Buddhists many times. In particular, in this book, there is a description how Aśoka (ca. 268 B.C. to 232 B.C.), the great Indian emperor of the Maurya Dynasty, has supported Moggaliputta-Tissa (ca. 327 B.C.-247 B.C.), his advisor and spiritual teacher, in organizing the Second Buddhist Council and sending theras to the following countries, among which there are mentioned Yona (Greco-Bactria), Kasmīra (Kashmir), and Gandhāra, where later the Greco-Buddhism was founded:
When the thera Moggaliputta, the illuminator of the religion of the Conqueror, had brought the (third) council to an end and when, looking into the future, he had beheld the founding of the religion in adjacent countries, (then) in the month Kattika he sent forth theras, one here and one there. The thera Majjhantika he sent to Kasmīra Vol. 13 (2019) On the Origin of Indian Logic from 381 and Gandhāra, the thera, Mahādeva he sent to Mahisaman . d . ala. To Vanavāsa he sent the thera named Rakkhita, and to Aparantaka the Yona named Dhammarakkhita; to Mahārat . t . ha (he sent) the thera named Mahādhammarakkhita, but the thera Mahārakkhita he sent into the country of the Yona. He sent the thera Majjhima to the Himalaya country, and to Suvan . n . abhūmi he sent the two theras Son . a and Uttara. The great thera Mahinda, the theras It . t . hiya, Uttiya, Sambala and Bhaddasāla his disciples, these five theras he sent forth with the charge: 'Ye shall found in the lovely island of Laṅkā the lovely religion of the Conqueror' [8, p. 82 ].
This quote is especially interesting, as the 'Yona named Dhammarakkhita,' i.e. a Greek, is been mentioned among the important Buddhist leaders and teachers at the time of Aśoka (the 3rd century B.C.). This is quite early, because the Greeks had come to the region of India only since the Indian campaign of Alexander the Great, starting in 326 B.C. It is said further that the mission of Maharakkhita was really successful among the Greeks of Greco-Bactria:
The wise Maharakkhita who went to the country of the Yona delivered in the midst of the people the Kalakarama-suttanta [A.Sch.the Kāl . akārāmasutta, Aṅguttara-nikāya 4.24]. A hundred and seventy thousand living beings attained to the reward of the path (of salvation); ten thousand received the pabbajja [8, p. 85 ].
The next significant evidence in the Mahāvam . sa about the Greco-Buddhists and their influence and spiritual power among all the Buddhist communities is as follows. One Sinhalese king of Sri Lanka, called Dut . t . hagāman .ī or Gāman .ī Abhaya ('fearless Gamini'), who reigned from 101 B.C. to 77 B.C., decided once to build up the Great Stūpa (Pāli: thūpa) that is known now as the Ruwanweliseya and Swarnamalee Chetiya and in order to celebrate the festival devoted to opening the Thūpa he invited many hundred thousand representatives of Buddhist communities from different places, including Kasmīra (Kashmir), Alasanda (the Greek city of Alexandria, a capital of Bactria), Pallavabhogga (Wilhelm Geiger means that it is Persia, but it is, most likely, Margiana in today's Afghanistan):
From various (foreign) countries also did many bhikkhus come hither; what need to speak of the coming of the brotherhood living here upon the island? With eighty thousand bhikkhus from the region of Rājagaha came the thera Indagutta, the head of a great school. From Isipatana came the great thera Dhammasena with twelve thousand bhikkhus to the place of the cetiya.
With sixty thousand bhikkhus came hither the great thera Piyadassi from the Jetārāma-vihāra. From the Mahāvana (monastery) in Vesālī came the thera Urubuddharakkhita with eighteen thousand bhikkhus. From the Ghositārāma in Kosambī came the thera Urudbammarakkhita with thirty thousand bhikkhus. From the 390 A. Schumann Log. Univers. and it can be written under the influence of discussions with the northern (Gandhāran) Buddhists. 5. The only book of early Pāli literature that is logical indeed in all meanings is the Milindapañha. It is an absolutely unique document, because it represents a dialogue with Menander, the king of the large empire in the North and the political leader of all Bactrian-Gandhāran Buddhists. Taking into account the fact that this book is so entirely different to any other book from the Pāli Canon, we can safely claim that it was written under a direct influence of the Greco-Buddhists or Bactrian-Gandhāran Buddhists. Reasons: (i) we can detect a strange dynamics in attitudes towards logic from negative ones in early texts to a neutral attitude in the Kathāvatthu and even to a positive attitude in the Milindapañha; (ii) the Milindapañha demonstrates a real logic that cannot be deduced from the other Pāli books even terminologically and has no analogues with the classical nyāya. So, the Milindapañha can have a non-Indian influence defined by us as the Greco-Buddhist one.
As we see, the Buddhist logic of the Milindapañha with the two sources of knowledge: paccakkha and anumāna, and with opamma as one way for verifying propositions came from the Greco-Buddhist syncretic culture that flourished in Gandhāra.
Conclusions
As a result of the structuralist analysis of logical competence in early Pāli literature, the following statements can be inferred:
1. In the Pāli Canon there was a tradition of Buddhist logic, but this tradition was weak, and the proto-logic, we can reconstruct on the basis of the Pāli texts by means of the historical reconstructive hermeneutics, can be evaluated as a predecessor of the nyāya and yogācāra logic. 2. At the time of the Pāli Canon there did not exist the nyāya philosophy known by the Nyāya Sūtra. 3. The Milindapañha, the best logical source of the Pāli Canon, can have been written under a direct influence of the Greco-Buddhists. 4. From the viewpoint of the Pāli Canon, the origin of Indian logic is connected to the community that the author of the Milindapañha belonged to, and this community was Greco-Buddhist. Therefore, we can claim that the first correct application of inference rules in the early Indian logic may be explained by a Gandhāran influence.
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